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BETTER FOOD MARKE'fS, INC. (a Corporation), Appel-
lant, v. AMERICAN DISTRIC'l' TELEGRAPH COM-
pANY (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[I] Telegraphs. and Telephones-Contracts for Services.-Where 
telegraph company agrees with plaintiff's food market, on 
receiving burglar alarm at its central station, to send repre-
sentatives to make arrest and to transmit alarm promptly 
to police headquarters, promptness is of the essence of its 
obligation and its delay in acting may be an omission to render 
the agreed service and a failure of performance of the con-
tract. 
[2] !d.-Contracts for Services-Directed Verdict.-In action for 
damages resulting from failure of defendant telegraph com-
pany installing burglar alarm system in plaintiff's food mar-
ket properly to perform agreement to transmit alarm signals 
to its guards and to police headquarters, it is error to order 
judgment for defendant on its motion for a directed verdict 
where there is evidence on which it could be found that 
plaintiff's loss was the proximate result of defendant's delay 
in responding to the alarms, the time and distance factors 
indicating that burglar may have been caught had the 
police and guards been called to the premises a few minutes 
earlier, and that a delay of nine minutes after plaintiff's 
safe had been opened permitted his escape. 
[3] Damages-Liquidated Damages and Penalties.-A valid agree-
ment may be made for the payment of liquidated damages, 
whereas an agreement for the payment of a penalty is in-
valid. 
[ 4] !d.-Liquidated Damages and. Penalties.-Parties are allowed 
to contract for liquidated damages if it is necessary to do 
so in order that they may know with reasonable certainty 
the extent of liability for a breach of the agreement. 
[5] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of 
Validity of Stipulation.-·Where parties to an agreement for 
liquidated damages exercise their business judgment in pro-
viding that it is impracticable and extremely difficult to fix 
the damages which may result from defendant's failure to 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Damages, § 94; Am.Jur., Damages, § 240. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Telegraphs and Telephones, § 2.5; 
[3, 4, 12, 15] Damages, § 117; [5, 8-11, 16] Damages, § 126; [6] 
Damages, §§ 117, 126; [7] Damages, §§ 158, 172; [13] Damages, 
§ 120; [14] Actions, § 15. 
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render its service, 8uch a provision is not controlling as to 
. the actual difficulty in fixing damagfls, although it is f\ntitled 
to some weight. 
[6] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provi-
sion.-Unless a clause providing for liquidated damages falls 
within the provisions of Civ. Code, § 1671, it is invalid; 
and except on admitted facts this is generally a question to 
be resolved by the trier of fact. 
L 7] !d.-Burden of Proof and Pleading-Liquidated Damages.·-
The burden is on the party seeking to rely on a liquidated 
damage provision in a contract to plead and prove facts 
showing impracticability of fixing actual damage. 
[8] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of 
Validity of Stipulation.-In determining whether it would be 
impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage 
in a case where the parties have contracted for liquidated 
damages, the court should place itself in the position of the 
parties at the time the contract was made and should con-
sider the nature of the breaches that might occur and any 
consequences that were reasonably foreseeable. 
[9] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of 
Validity of Stipulation.-Where a trial court finds that it is 
impracticable or extremely difficult to fix damages so as to 
render provision in contract for payment of certain sum on 
breach thereof a provision for liquidated damages rather than 
a penalty, but it appears to a reviewing court that from the 
nature of the possible detriment the damages could have been 
fixed without difficulty, a judgment based on such finding will 
be reversed. 
[10] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of 
Validity of Stipulation.-Whether it was impracticable or 
extremely difficult to fix damages so as to make contract 
provision for payment of certain sum of money on breach 
thereof a provision for liquidated damages, rather than a 
penalty, becomes a question of law where the facts are not 
in dispute and admit of but a single conclusion. 
[11] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of 
Validity of Provision.-Where agreement by defendant tele-
graph company to transmit burglar alarm signals from plain-
tiff's store to its own guards and to police headquarters con-
tains provision that it is impracticable and extremely difficult 
to fix actual damages which might result from failure to 
perform such services and that in case of such failure and a 
resulting loss the company's damages shall be limited to $50 as 
!iquidated damages and not as a penalty, the uncertainties as 
to what might have happened if plaintiff's store were en-
tered are so great, and the possibilities of defendant's failure 
to perform its obligation are so innumerable, that there is 
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no basis for a conclusion that it would have been practicable 
or reasonably possible for the parties to fix the probable 
damage, and hence such provision is one for liquidated dam-
ages as a matter of law. 
[12] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provi-
sion.-The validity of a clause for liquidated damages re-
quires that the parties to the contract "agree therein upon 
an amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of 
damages sustained by a breach thereof" ( Civ. Code, § 1671), 
and this amount must represent the result of a reasonable 
endeavor by the parties to estimate a fair average compensa-
tion for any loss that may be sustained. 
[13] Id.- Liquidated Damages and Penalties- Construction of 
Stipulation.--Where impracticability or extreme difficulty in 
fixing damages if contract should be breached appears as 
a matter of law, and the parties have expressly agreed on 
a certain sum as liquidated damages, they did not contract 
for a penalty if the actual loss resulting from a breach could 
in many cases be less than the amount provided for and could 
in many other cases exceed that amount, since to constitute 
a penalty the amount provided for would bear no reason-
able relation to the losses the parties thought might be sus-
tained. 
[14] Actions-Contract or Tort.-Although an action in tort may 
sometimes be brought for the negligent breach of a con-
tractual duty, still the nature of the duty owed and the con-
sequences of its breach must be determined by reference to 
the contract which created that duty. 
[15] Damages-Liquidated Damages and Penalties.-Where the 
breach of a duty created only by contract is a negligent one, 
the application of a valid clause for liquidated damages may 
not be avoided by bringing an action in tort. 
[16] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determination of 
Validity of Stipulation.-The validity of a liquidated dam-
age clause in a contract must be determined in accordance 
with the facts and circumstances in Pach particular case. 
A PPliJA Ij from a j ndgment of the Snperior Court of I1os 
.\11g·e.Jrs County. Arthnr Crnm, ,Judge. Modified and af-
firmed. 
Action for damages for breach of contract. Judgment for 
tleff'JI(lant modified and affirmed. 
Eug·pue S. Jve;; aud ,John Goddard for Appellant. 
Lawler, Felix & Hall, Reed A. Stout and John M. Hall 
for Respondent. 
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SHENK, ,J.-This is an action brought on counts alleged 
in tort and in contract wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover 
damages resulting from the alleged failure of the defendants 
to properly transmit burglar alarm signals to their own guards 
and to the headquarters of the municipal police department. 
Such failure is alleged to have permitted a burglar to escape 
with the sum of $35,930 taken from the plaintiff's food market. 
On the first trial the court granted a motion for nonsuit in 
behalf of all the defendants except the .American District Tele-
graph Company, and ordered judgment for those defendants. 
As against the defendant American District Telegraph Com-
pany the jury on the first trial found for the plaintiff, but a 
new trial was granted on the ground of insufficiency of the 
evidence. On the second trial the jury was unable to agree 
and was dismissed. Thereafter the defendant successfully 
moved for a directed verdict pursuant to section 630 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure (ordering judgment where motion 
for directed verdict should have been, but was not, granted), 
and the court ordered judgment for the defendant. On this 
appeal taken from that judgment the plaintiff contends that 
there is sufficient evidence of the defendant's negligence and 
breach of contract to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff, and 
that it was error to grant the motion for a directed verdict. 
In June of 1947 the parties entered into a written agree-
ment whereby the defendant was to install and maintain itR 
standard ''Central Station Burglar Alarm and Holdup Sys-
tem" in the plaintiff's food market. The contract provided 
that the defendant "on receipt of a burglar alarm signal 
from the Subscriber's [plaintiff's] premises, agrees to send 
to said premises, its representatives to act as agent of and 
in the interest of the Subscriber .... The Subscriber hereby 
authorizes and directs the Contractor [defendant] to cause 
the arrest of any person or persons unauthorized to enter his 
premises and to hold him or them until released by the Sub-
scriber .... The Contractor, on receipt of a holdup alarm 
signal from the Subscriber's premises, agrees to transmit the 
alarm promptly to headquarters of the public police depart-
ment." 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff on thiR appeal from a judgment on a directed ver-
dict for the defendant, (Anthony v. Hobbie, 25 Cal.2d 814 
r155 P.2d 826]) the following facts were established: On 
November 16, 1947, at approximately 7 :30 p.m. the assistant 
manager of the plaintiff's market set the burglar alarm system 
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and locked the building. As he entered his car in the parking 
lot he was accosted by an armed robber and at gunpoint 
forced to return and open the store, the inner office and the 
safe. The robber took the contents of the safe, taped the 
assistant manager, and left. Approximately 14 minutes elapsed 
between the time when the store was reopened and when the 
robber left the store with the loot. During this period signals 
were being received at the defendant's central station in-
(licating the sequence of the opening and closing of the doors. 
The defendant's operators at the central station did not call 
a guard or inform the police until 7 :51, nine minutes after 
the signal indicating that the safe had been opened, was re-
ceived. The assistant manager had succeeded in knocking a 
telephone off the hook and calling for help at approximately 
7 :50. The police arrived at the market at 7 :52, within one 
minute after receiving a call. The defendant's guards arrived 
shortly thereafter. The assistant manager's watch was broken 
at the time he was taped and the hands had stopped at 7 :50. 
[1] Under the circumstances of this case it would have 
been reasonable to conclude that the defendant had a duty to 
call the police as well as its own guards to the plaintiff's 
premises. Promptness being the essence of the defendant's 
obligation, its delay in acting could reasonably be found to 
be an omisison to render the agreed service and a failure of 
performance of the contract. 
[2] There is evidence upon which it could have been 
found that the loss was the proximate result of the defendant's 
delay in responding to the alarms. There was but one in-
dividual committing the burglary. He acted deliberately and 
there is reason to believe that the agreement between the 
parties was entered into with the intention of providing for 
the apprehension of such a person before he left the premises. 
The time and distance factors indicate that this particular 
burglar may have been caught had the police and guards been 
called to the premises a few minutes earlier, and that the 
delay of nine minutes after the safe had been opened permitted 
the escape. Such probabilities are to be weighed in the light 
of common experience in such matters and present a triable 
issue of fact. There was substantial evidence from which a 
jury could have found that the plaintiff's loss was the proxi-
mate result of the defendant's breach of its contract. Therefore 
it was error for the trial court to order judgment for the de-
fendant on its motion for a directed verdict. 
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There remains the qHcstion of the validity of the following 
pnn·isions of thr <·ontrart for liquidated damages: ''It is 
agr<'ed by ami betwern the parties that the Contractor is not 
an insurer, that t}w payments hereinbefore named are based 
solely on the value of the service in the maintenance of the 
system described, that it is impracticable and extremely difficult 
to fix the actual damages, if any, which may proximately re-
sult from a failure to perform such services and in case of 
failure to perform such services and a resulting loss its 
liability hereunder shall be limited to and fixed at the sum of 
fifty dollars as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, and 
this liability shall be exclusive.'' 
[3] It is generally recognized that a valid agreement may 
be made for the payment of liquidated damages, whereas an 
agreement for the payment of a penalty is invalid. [ 4] Un-
der the law generally the parties are allowed to contract for 
liquidated damages if it is necessary to do so in order that 
they may know with reasonable certainty the extent of lia-
bility for a breach of the agreement. [5] Where the parties 
exercise their business judgment in providing that it is im-
practicable and extremely difficult to fix the damages which 
may result from the defendant's failure. to render its service 
such a provision is not controlling as to the actual difficulty 
in fixing damag·es, although it is entitled to some weight. 
(See Sta1·k v. Shemada, 187 Cal. 785, 788 [204 P. 214]; Dyer 
Bros. Golden West Iron Works v. Central Iron Works, 182 
Cal. 588, 592 [189 P. 445] ; see, also, Restatement of Contracts, 
§ 339(f), p. 544.) 
The statutory law and its interpretation in this state are 
in accord with the general law. Civil Code section 1670 states 
that a provision in a contract which provides for the amount 
of dnmages to be paid in the event of a breach of the contract 
is void, except as expressly provided in section 1671 as follows: 
''The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an amount 
which shall be presumed to be the amount of damage sus-
tained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the case, 
it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the 
actual damage." [6] Unless a clause providing for liqui-
dated damages falls within the provisions of section 1671 it 
is invalid (Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Wo1·ks v. Central 
Iron Works, supra, 182 Cal. 588, 593; Long Beach City School 
Dist. v. Dodge, 135 Cal. 401, 405 [67 P. 499]); and except on 
admitted facts this is generally a question to be resolved by 
the trier of fact (Rice v. Schrnicl, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385 [115 P.2d 
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498, 138 A.L.R. 589] ; Petrovich v. City of Arcadia, 36 Cal.2d 
78, 86 [222 P.2d 231]; Dyer Br·os. Golden West Iron Works 
v. Central Iron Works, supra, 182 Cal. 588, 593). [7] It is 
settled law that the burden is on the party seeking to rely 
11pon a liquidated damage provision in a contract to plead and 
proYe facts showing impracticability (Rice v. Schmid, supr·a, 
18 Cal.2d 382, 385; Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Works v. 
(; entral I ron Works, supra, 182 Cal. 588, 593). 
'rhe plaintiff argues that there is no difficulty in the present 
ease in fixing the actual damage and that the amount of money 
stolen should be the actual damage. Its contention is that 
the time for the determination of the question of the im-
practicability and difficulty in fixing the damages is after 
the loss has occurred. This is not the rule. [8] In determin-
ing this question the court should place itself in the position 
of the parties at the time the contract was made and should 
eonsider the nature of the breaches that might oecur and any 
('omwquences that were reasonably foreseeable. In Hanlon 
Drydock Etc. Co. v. McNear, Inc., 70 Cal.App. 204 [232 P. 
1002] (relying on Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110, 
120 [27 P. 36, 25 1\m.St.Rep. 102]) the court, in dealing 
with the question presented by the plaintiff's contention, 
stated at page 211: ''If adopted it would practically destroy 
the power given contracting parties under section 1671 of 
the Civil Code in any case to make a binding agreement as to 
stipulated damages .... Appellant's theory is manifestly 
contrary to authorities of other jurisdietions, notably the fed-
eral jurisdiction; it finds no support in the text-books so far 
as our attention has been calJed and if inference may be in-
dulged in, we think the cases of the local jurisdiction clearly 
indicate that there is no intention to depart from the universal 
rnle established elsewhere." The court cited numerous 
anthoritirs supporting the general proposition quoted from 
New Brita£n v. New Br£tain Tel. Co., 74 Conn. 326 )50 A. 
R81, 884, 1015): "It is the look forward and not backward. 
that we are ealled upon to take." This rule is too well settled 
to admit of further discussion. 
h1 the pre,;ent eaKf' thcr·e was no finding with respeet to 
tlu• impradieability or extreme difficulty in fixing· damages. 
(9] Where a trial (·ourt does find that sueh a situation did 
exifit but it appears to a reviewing court that from the nature 
()f the possible detriment the damages could have been fixed 
without difficulty, a judgment based on the finding will be 
reversed (Stark v. Shemada, supra, 187 Cal. 785). [10] rrhe 
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question becomes one of law where the facts are not in dispute 
and admit of but a single conclusion. Such is the present 
case. [11] When the uncertainties as to what might have 
happened if the plaintiff's store were entered is viewed from 
the position of the contracting parties, it satisfactorily ap-
pears that there is no basis whatever for a conclusion that it 
would have been practicable or reasonably possible for the 
parties to fix the probable damage. The question, upon the 
admitted facts, is clearly one of law. 
'rhe possibilities of the consequences of a failure of the 
dPfendant to perform its obligation nuder the contract are 
innumerable. A failure to receive the signals, or to respond 
to them, or to report them to the plaintiff would be a viola-
tion of the agreement. Entrances to the building after work-
ing hours might be made by persons having authority as 
well as by burglars or by persons bent upon mischief. They 
migbt or might not cause damage. There might be the theft 
of a ham, or of a truckload of goods, or the contents of a safe. 
There might be a breaking in for the purpose of theft and no 
theft. If money was taken it might be a few dollars or many 
thousands. Books might be tampered with, or papers ab-
stracted. Damage might be caused in many ways that were 
not foreseeable. In short, it was extremely difficult to predict 
the nature and extent of the loss. Furthermore, there was 
no way of ascertaining what portion of any loss sustained 
could be attributed to the defendant's failure to perform. 
The contra·ct specifically provided that the defendant was not 
an insurer. Therefore, if it should have fully performed on 
the contract and a loss resulted nevertheless it could in no way 
be liable. The parties recognize, then, that losses might have 
resulted which were not causally connected with the de-
fendant's failure of performance. Where there had been a 
failure of performance and a loss, what part of that loss 
<·ould be attributed to the failure of performance; or how 
much of that losR would have resulted had there not been a 
failure of performance~ Under the complexity of the cir-
cumstances in this case the parties could not answer this 
question. There being no reasonable basis upon which to 
predict the nature and extent of any loss, or how much of that 
loss the defendant's failure of performance might account for, 
it is certain that it would have been ''impracticable or ex-
tremely difficult to fix the actual damage" (Civ. Code, § 1671). 
[12] The validity of a clause for liquidated damages re-
quires that the parties to the contract ''agree therein upon an 
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amoimt whi(•b slwJl he presume<l to be the amount of damages 
sustairwd by a breach thereof ... " ( Civ. Code, § 1671.) This 
amount must represent the result of a reasonable endeavor 
by the parties to estimate a fair average compensation for 
any loss that may be sustained. (Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron 
Works v. Central Iron Works, supm, 182 Cal. 588; Rice v. 
Schmid, supt·a, 18 Cal.2d 382, 386; Restatement, Contracts, 
§ 339, p. 554.) It has been suggested that the greater the 
difficulty encountered by the parties in estimating the damages 
which might arise from a breach, the greater should be the 
range of estimates which the courts should uphold as reason-
able. (5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1059, p. 291.) The plaintiff's 
contention that the agreed amount did not represent an en-
deavor by the parties to estimate the probable damage is based 
on evidence that the liquidation clause was part of the printed 
material in a form contract generally used by the defendant 
in dealing with subscribers such as the plaintiff, and that 
the defendant did not investigate the plaintiff's manner of 
conducting its business or the character and value of its stock. 
Nevertheless the parties agreed to the liquidation provisions, 
and there is no evidence that they were not fully aware of 
circumstances making it desirable that liquidated damages be 
provided for. 
ln the present case the impracticability or extreme difficulty 
in fixing actual damages appeared as a matter of law. In 
the exercise of their business judgment the parties reasonably 
agreed that in all cases of breach by the defendant the dam-
ages would be tix(ed at $50 whether in fact the defendant's 
loss for a given breach was greater or less than that amount. 
As previously stated the stipulation that the amount was 
to be paid "as liquidated damages and not as a penalty" 
while entitled to some weight is not conclusive. [13] Never-
theless, it is elear that the actual loss resulting from a breach 
eould in many eases be less than the amount provided for. 
Tt is equally dear that in many other cases the actual loss 
would exceed that amount. To construe this as a penalty it 
would have to be said that the amount provided to be paid 
bore no reasonable relation to the losses the parties thought 
might be sustained. This may not rightly be stated. 
'rhe plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect of the liquidation 
elause on the g-round that it has no application to a tort action. 
However, the plaintiff makes no claim that a duty was owed 
to it outsidf' of that crf'ated by the contract, and no breach of 
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du1y \Ht;.: allf'gc•d otlwr than a failure to rendf'r tlw eontraetPd 
fc,r srt·Yi<•e. [14] Although an aetion in tort may somf'times 
Jw bt·ought for the nPgligt>nt breach of a contractual duty 
(Jones v. ]{ cfly, 20:-1 Cal. 251 J280 P. 942 J), still the nature 
of the duty owed and the consequences of its breach must be 
determined by reference to the contract which created that 
duty. In the present case the duty created by the contract 
was one for whieh liability for a breach thereunder was fixed, 
and whether the action is brought in tort or in contract the 
nature of the duty remains the same. [15] The plaintiff cites 
no authority and none has been discovered to the effect that 
where the breach of a duty created only by contract is a 
negligent one the application of a valid clause for liquidated 
damages may be avoided by bringing an action in tort. 
The plaintiff relies upon a number of cases holding that 
agreements purporting to be for liquidated damages were 
in fact agreements for penalties. (Pacific Factor Co. v. A.dler, 
supra, 90 Cal. llO; StaTk v. Shemada, SUJJra, 187 Cal. 785; 
Rice v. Schmid, supra, 18 Cal.2d 382; RobeTt Marsh & Co., 
Inc., v. Tremper·, 210 Cal. 572 [292 P. 950] ; Eva v. McJJiahon, 
77 Cal. 467 [19 P. 872] ; Sherman v. Gray, 11 Cal.App. 348 
J104 P. 1004].) [16] The validity of a liquidation clause in a 
eontract must be determined in accordance with the facts and 
eircumstances of each particular case. The factual situations 
in the eases relied upon make them inapplicable to the present 
c~asP. As a group they are distinguishable upon the ground 
that in each there were factors which would permit the parties 
to fairly estimate actual damages in the event of a breach-
as a predetermined amount for every item of merchandise an 
obligor failed to deliver. There was no inherent uncertainty 
as to the amount of loss that could be sustained, as in the 
present case. The function of the agreed sum in each of those 
eases vvas to insure performance by the obligor and was prop-
r•r·ly held to be a penalty. 
'!'he order directing a verdict for the defendants involved 
questions of fact which could have been found in the plaintiff's 
favor. However, the error warrants only a qualified reversal 
of the judgment, as the plaintiff's recovery is limited to $50 if 
he should prevail on a retrial. 
The judgment of the trial court is modified to provide 
as follows: "It is ordered, adjndg·ed and decreed that plain-
tiff rPPover from the r1efendant, American District 'l'elegraph 
Company. the snm of $i"i0.00 without costs." As so modified 
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the judgment is affirmed. Each party shall bear its own 
eosts on appeal. 
Gib~:;on, C. J., Edmonds, ,J ., Traynor, J., Schauer, .J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CAWl'ER, J.--I dissent. 
'l'his court holds the following provisiOn a valid eontraet 
for liquidated damages: "It is agreed by and betwt~en the 
parties that the Contractor [defendant] is not an insurer, 
that tlte payments hereinbefore named are based solely on the 
'l•aluc of the service in maintenance of the system described, 
that it is irwpmcticable and exkemely difficult to fix the 
actual damages, if any, which may proximately result fn;m a 
failure to perform such services and in case of failtlre to 
?Jcrform Stlch services and a resulting loss its l1:ability here-
under shall be limited to and fixed at the sum of fifty dollars 
as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, and this liability 
shall be exclusive." (Emphasis added.) 
It is conceded that defendant failed to perform its duty: 
that plaintiff's loss resulted therefrom; that plaintiff's loss 
was the sum of $35,930 which was taken, by a burglar, from 
plaintiff's food market. 
In order to uphold the so-called $50 liquidated damage 
provision, it was necessary for the majority to find that dam-
ages were "impracticable or extremely difficult" to fix at the 
time the contract was entered into, and further that the $50 
provision bore a reasonable relation to any loss which the 
parties contemplatrd might be sustained as a result of a breach 
of the contract. 
It is said in the majority opinion that ''In determining th iR 
question l the losses which might be expected to occur] the 
eonrt should place itself in the position of the parties at the 
tinH' thr eontract was made and should consider the natm·r• 
of 1h(• breaehrs that might occur and any consequences that 
wen• reasonably foreseeable." Placing myself in the position 
of tlw parties at the time the contract was entered into. T 
wonld say that one way of ascertaining the loss which might 
occur, was to take an average of the amount of cash left in the 
safe in tlw stol'e oveJ·nig,ht; an inventory of the averag·e mer-
dw.ndise kept in the store. If the losses sustained did not 
approximatr the damages providrd for by the parties. th~e 
rule set forth in Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224 
190 BBTTER .F'ooD MKTS. v. AMER. DisT. TELEG. Co. [ 40 C.2d 
l50 S.Ct. 142, 74 L.Ed. 382], would be applicable. There the 
parties provided for excessive liquidated damages, and the 
Supreme Court held that the damages provided for in the 
contract bore no reasonable relation to the probable loss to be 
sustained and held the provision a penalty and therefore unen-
forceable. It is the rule that the validity of the provision 
must be proved by the one seeking to enforce it. And as is 
said in the majority opinion ''Where a trial court does find 
that such a situation did exist [impracticability or extreme 
difficulty in fixing damages] but it appears to a reviewing 
court that from the nature of the possible detriment the dam-
ag·es could have been fixed without difficulty, a judgment 
based on the finding will be reversed (Stark v. Shemada, 
supra, 187 CaL 785)." 
It is also said in the majority opinion that "The question 
becomes one of law where the facts are not in dispute and 
admit of but a single conclusion." Even if the facts are not 
in dispute, they seldom admit of but one conclusion. In this 
ease, one jury found for plaintiff and the second jury dis-
agreed. Does this not prove that these facts admit of more 
than one conclusion? I think it does. It is also said here 
that whether damages are impracticable, or extremely difficult, 
to fix is ''except on admitted facts . . . generally a question 
to be resolved by the trier of fact .... '' In Rice v. Schmid, 
18 Cal.2d 382 [115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R. 589] (the latest pro-
nouncement of this court on this subject), it was held that in 
"each instance" it was a question of fact. Further, even on 
admitted facts, more than one inference can be, and is often, 
drawn. (See Black v. Black, 91 Cal.App.2d 328 [204 P.2d 
950] [stipulated facts; different inferences possible] ; Cris-
man v. Lanterman, 149 Cal. 647 [87 P. 89, 117 Am.St.Rep. 
167] [agreed statement of facts; different inferences pos-
sible l; Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal.App.2d 50 [172 P.2d 533] 
/evidence not conflicting; conflicting inferences therefrom 
possible]; Rench v. McMullen, 82 Cal.App.2d 872 [187 P.2d 
J 11] jonly documentary evidence offered was subject to con-
flicting inferences] . ) Again, this court goes to great lengths 
to uphold the validity of a provision such as this. Note the 
"possibilities" which it considers might have happened from 
a failure of the burglar detection system. It is said that 
''Entrances to the building after working hours might be 
made by persons having authority as well as by burglars or 
by persons bent on mischief. They might or might not cans~ 
Feb.1953] BE'l'TER FooD MKTS. v. A1~IER. D1s•r. TELEG. Co. 191 
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damage. There might be the theft of a ham, or of a truekload 
of goods, or the (~ontents of a safe. There might be a breaking 
iu for the purpose of theft and no theft. If money was taken 
it might be a few dollars or many thousands. Books might be 
tampered with, or papers abstracted. Damage might be caused 
iu many ways that were not foreseeable." If persons having 
autlwrity to enter did so, plaintiff would, in all probability, 
not have sued the defendant, or, if it had done so, that would 
have been a matter of defense at the trial. If a ham had been 
stolen, the provision for $50 in all probability, would have been 
held a penalty as disproportionate to the loss involved. These 
same arguments apply to the balance of the ''reasoning'' of the 
majority. 
It is also necessary that the amount agreed upon by the 
parties ''represent the result of a reasonable endeavor by the 
parties to estimate a fair average compensation for any loss 
that may be sustained. (Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Works 
v. Central lt'on Works, supra, 182 Cal. 588; Rice v. Schmid, 
supra, 18 Cal.2d 382, 386; Restatement, Contracts, § 339, p. 
554.) '' In other words, the amount agreed upon must bear 
some reasonable relation to the losses which might occur as a 
result of a breach. In my opinion, the $50 provision bears no 
reasonable relation to any amount which might have been lost 
by a failure of the system to operate. 
'l'he characteristic feature of a penalty is that it bears 
no relation to the actual damage which may be caused by a 
breach, but is arbitrarily fixed without any attempt to esti-
mate the amount of injury. (8 Cal.Jur. 847.) The majority 
admits that the validity of a liquidation clause in a contract 
must be determined in accordance with the facts and circum-
stances of each particular case, but distinguishes the follow-
ing cases: Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110 [27 P. 36, 
25 Am.St.Rep. 102], Stark v. Shemada, 187 Cal. 785 [204 P. 
214], Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382 [115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R. 
589], Robert Mar-sh & Co., Inc. v. Tremper, 210 Cal. 572 
1292 P. 950], Eva v. McMahon, 77 Cal. 467 [19 P. 872], 
8her·man v. Gray, 11 Cal.App. 348 [104 P. 1004], on the 
ground that ''in each there were factors which would permit 
the parties to fairly estimate actual damages in the event of a 
breach-as a predetermined amount for every item of mer-
chandise an obligor failed to deliver," and that "The function 
of the agreed sum in each of those cases was to insure per-
formance by the obligor and was properly held to be a 
192 ATKINSON v. PACIFIC FIRE ExTINGUISHER Co. [40 C.2d 
JWnalty." I find no diRtingui,hing features. It appears to 
l!H-• that tl1P $fi0 provisiou hf're might just as well be held to 
be a rwnalty iu tlw eYent of nonperformanee by the defendant, 
and that it eert11inly bPars no reasonable relation to the losses 
which the parties had in eontemplation. 
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial 
eourt to rt>try the ease and submit the issue of damages to 
the jnry. 
[S. ]'. No. 18603. In Bank. ]~eb. 6, 1953.] 
IIAI_j lVI. ATKINSON et al., Respondents, v. PACIFIC FIRE 
EXTINGUISHER COMPANY, Appellant. 
[l] Contracts-Performance-Waiver of Breach.-Where contract 
by which defendant company installed fire detection system 
in plaintiffs' planing mill provides for an annual rental pay-
able in monthly installments, defendant's acceptance of over-
due payments constitutes a waiver of strict compliance by 
plaintiffs. 
[2a, 2b] Damages-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Determin-
ation of Validity of Stipulation.-Provision in contract that 
in case of failure of fire detection system installed by defend-
ant company in plaintiffs' planing mill to perform detection 
service and a resulting loss the company's liability shall be lim-
ited to $25 as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, is 
a valid provision for liquidated damages where the parties 
had no way of knowing what type of fire might occur after 
a particular failure of the detection system and could not 
have predicted what portion of the loss in any particular 
fire would be the proximate result of failure of such system, 
and where the uncertain extent to which losses might occur, 
viewed from the time of entering into the contract, would 
make the task of fixing damages an extremely difficult if not 
an impossible one. 
[3] !d.-Liquidated Damages and Penalties-Validity of Provi-
sion.-One who relies on a clause for liquidated damages in a 
contract must show that the parties to the contract "agree 
therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the 
amount of damages sustained by a breach- thereof." ( Civ. 
Code, § 1671.) 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Damages, § 94; Am.Jur., Damages, § 240. 
McK. Dig. References: [1 J Contracts, § 248; [2, 6] Damages, 
§ 126; [3, 4] Damages, § 117; [5] Damages, § 120. 
